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As people increasingly receive their news via social media in the Internet age, 
some political scientists have begun to examine which factors cause seemingly intelligent 
individuals to believe false political information. Because Facebook and other social 
media sites have been hesitant to dedicate enough resources to have effective filtering, 
fact-checking, or editorial judgment, they allow fake news to spread unrestrainedly. In 
my project, I discuss the cognitive and situational factors that lead people to believe fake 
news. By administering a survey analyzing people’s ability to assess the veracity of 
political advertisements, I find that strong political partisans are far less likely to critically 





Who Believes Fake News?  
Why partisans are more likely to believe false political information read on social media 
 
The November 2016 election between candidates Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton saw an unprecedented level of foreign meddling in attempts to influence the 
election of the most powerful democracy in the world. In October of 2016, the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
assessed Russia’s interference in the election after concerns were raised over the 
influence this had on President Trump’s appointment. According to the assessment, the 
attack was ordered by Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, and partly carried out in the 
form of so-called “fake news” circulating social media. The committee estimated that 
nearly 11.4 million Americans were exposed to these deceptive advertisements during 
and after the election cycle (Select Committee on Intelligence 2019). 
While it is unknown whether Russia’s meddling changed the outcome of the 
election, the results showed Hillary Clinton defeated Donald Trump in the popular vote 
by almost 3 million, and with election margins as narrow as this, citizens should be 
concerned with the spread of false political information and what they can do to be more 
critical consumers. News has been an instrument of democracy since the invention of the 
printing press, and as our technology has evolved, the media’s traditional “watchdog 
role” has become even more instrumental in shaping public opinion and ensuring that 
citizens have the information they need to make informed decisions regarding their 
governance. In recent years, we have seen a growing trend where social media is slowly 
replacing traditional forms of news. In 2017, 62 percent of Americans reported receiving 
all or some of their news on social media platforms (Alcott 2017). 
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Returning to the role of social media in light of the controversial 2016 election, 
one national survey found that more than half of American citizens reported an increased 
attention to politics as a result of the 2016 election (Pew Research 2017a). Given this 
convergence of factors – the public is increasingly turning to social media for their 
political news and international and/or domestic actors are increasingly spreading false 
information to manipulate political outcomes – then the first step to countering a cyber-
attack would be to evaluate who is the most at risk to seeing and believing fake news. 
This is especially important given that many Americans may overestimate their ability to 
identify false news sources; as one study from Pew Research (2016) found that most 
Americans reported they were at least somewhat or mostly confident that they can 
identify when a news story is fabricated. I therefore dedicate my research to answering 
this question: what are the cognitive and situational factors that make people more likely 
to believe blatantly false or deceptive political news? 
Understanding How People Process Information: Biased Information Processing  
 People are exposed to new information every day, and for decades scientists have 
studied how people update preexisting beliefs in an ever-changing world. Natural 
cognitive processes play a significant role in explaining why fake news is so easily 
believed. One classic study about perceptual bias contends that people filter out 
information that contradicts or does not conform to their preexisting political views 
(Gerber 1999). One study shows that there are cognitive costs from holding views that 
are inconsistent; humans are motivated to maintain harmony among their existing beliefs 
(Lodge 2013). Additionally, people are more likely to process information and re-
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organize it to arrive at the conclusions they want to arrive at instead of ones that 
challenge their preexisting views (Kunda 1990).  
 Another study looked at the affect disconfirmation biases has on people’s ability 
to evaluate policy issues. It found that not only do people counter-argue information they 
disagree with, but also that these views are further polarized as a result of the biased 
processing (Taber 2009).   
The Role of Partisanship: Worsening Information Processing  
Not only do different people look at the exact same piece of evidence and 
interpret that evidence entirely differently, partisans – specifically, Republicans and 
Democrats – might be more susceptible to this type of biased information processing than 
the average user. Jerit (2012) contends that once a person forms a belief about a candidate 
or political issue, they do not evaluate new information regarding these factors without 
biases. In fact, they are likely to negate views that do not confirm their pre-existing 
opinions. In sum, there are very specific cognitive processes that make it harder to learn 
some information than others, thus making biased information processing unavoidable. 
Another study by Kahan (2012) evaluated the various sources of ideological polarization 
over a variety of social issues generally separating Republicans and Democrats. It 
showed that Republicans and Democrats were equally as bad at objectively evaluating 
information, and that members from both parties had a tendency to manipulate empirical 
evidence to support their ideological predispositions. 
Understanding the Nature of Social Media  
Psychologists have attempted to explain how the nature of social media increases 
the problems with cognitive information processing. The structure of social media – 
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specifically the unlimited flow of communication, rapidity of information disclosure, 
echo chambers, and the different purposes for using social media- decrease our already 
flawed cognitive processes and make us less critical information consumers.  
Exposure  
Social media has an information priming advantage; the free flow of information 
on social media increases the ability of news stories to essentially “prime” the viewer 
towards a particular viewpoint. Even a single exposure to a fabricated piece of political 
information would greatly increase a person’s likelihood of perceived accuracy 
(Pennycook 2018).  Alternatively, while prior exposure may increases the likelihood a 
person will believe information, one study found that receiving information contrary to 
your own opinion actually encourages people to seek out like-minded content; even if 
false (Weeks 2017).  Given that social media allows users to engage with and share 
political information with few restrictions, social media may play in to both of these 
information biases by not only priming a story but also allowing people to find false 
sources to contradict any “good” information they receive.  It is no wonder, then that 
during the 2016 election, fake news stories outperform factual news stories in the amount 
of shares, likes, and comments they received (Pennycook 2018). This means that people 
are being exposed to false information at higher rates than ever before, and that this 
increased exposure through social media may be contaminating voter information. 
Rapid Information Disclosure  
Sensationalized false information aimed at retaining reader’s attention has been a 
mechanism for selling information throughout history, but social media greatly amplifies 
the pace of information dissemination (Figueira 2017). The format in which news is 
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presented on social media is vastly different than in more traditional sources like 
newspapers or television coverage. Posts are shorter and circulate at much faster rates, 
and the average viewer only views an article for 15 seconds or less (Martin 2018). The 
“shelf life” for news stories is relatively brief, and by the time fact-checking 
organizations can dismantle fake news, the story could have reached millions of users 
(Kim 2018). Furthermore, “traditional” journalists may perpetuate the false news cycle 
by relying on social media as sources without checking the accuracy of this reporting.  
This is because journalists are struggling to keep up with the 24 hour news cycle, thus 
giving greater attention to the headline or gist of the news story than the truth in order to 
receive the news quicker and more efficiently (Kim 2018). 
Stopping the spread of distorted information before it reaches millions of users in 
minutes is simply impossible without significant changes to current communicative 
structures. Even if fact-checking sources are able to present counter information, this may 
not be enough to undo the damage caused by the spread of a false news story. One study 
found that even when presented with fact-checking materials, people developed more 
accurate factual beliefs about information, but this counter information had no effect on 
the overall attitudes and opinion about issues or candidates (Nyhan 2019).   
Echo Chambers 
In addition to the complete lack of institutional regulations surrounding social 
media, sites are becoming increasingly polarized and present users with information that 
confirms their preexisting beliefs in algorithmic “echo chambers.” Echo chambers allow 
users to essentially select the news sources they wish to engage in and increase 
confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, making the truth even harder to recognize 
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(Shao 2017). This tendency of users to self-select into certain social media groups may be 
even further exacerbated by the algorithms social media platforms use to determine the 
sharing of information.  For instance, Facebook attempts to increase user satisfaction by 
presenting information that a person is likely to engage with or that fits their prior beliefs 
(Kim and Dennis 2018). As a result, people are significantly less likely to find news 
stories that challenge their opinions on their social media news feed (Garret 2009). This 
politically motivated selective exposure is polarizing internet users and causing them to 
be more biased information processors overall.  
Hedonistic Framing 
 Finally, the mindset people have while using social media might undermine their 
ability to approach the information they receive from a more critical mindset. People 
generally use social media for hedonistic purposes, such as entertainment or connecting 
with friends and family, instead of utilitarian ones, such as completing work tasks (Kim 
2018). This hedonistic mindset hinders users ability to asses information because they are 
evaluating it based on what they hope is reality instead of actual reality, meaning that 
they have a much weaker incentive to question their social media information sources. 
This mental disengagement becomes more dangerous when, as mentioned previously, 
sites like Facebook attempt to maximize user satisfaction by presenting articles and 
stories that the user prefers, causing them to be exposed to a much smaller range of 
viewpoints than what is actually shared on social media collectively. 
Theory: Social Media through a Partisanship Bias 
 A combination of our natural cognitive processes and the nature of social media 
explain why people are so susceptible to fake news. But one type of person is potentially 
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more susceptible to the deception of fake news than others – political partisans. People 
already have a natural inclination to believe information that confirms their biases, but 
partisans would be more likely to seek out echo chambers than people who fall in the 
middle of a social issue or do not have an opinion. And, because the people who seek out 
echo chambers are less engaged in quality control (because they are seeking out 
information that confirms their beliefs), partisans will be more likely to view fake news 
headlines that confirm their biases.  They are also more likely to share blatantly false 
news stories in their networks, leading these stories to circulate quickly in the echo 
chambers environment.  
 Arguably, the most dangerous characteristic of social media in terms of 
truthfulness is the quick information dissemination. Politically informed institutions and 
individuals have no chance to combat the fake news because the story would have 
reached a significant portion of the population before they could post a rebuttal. The way 
news circulates social media only worsens people’s already flawed cognitive functions, 
and that is why there are strong implications of uncontrolled fake news. This leads me to 
the hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: Strong partisans will be less successful at identifying false 
information on social media than weak partisans or independents.  
 
Methodology: The Experimental Protocol 
 To test this hypothesis, I created a survey that tests people’s ability to critically 
assess political information in relation to their political participation and social media 
habits. The survey asked participants to identify the trustworthiness of 10 political 
advertisements, and it took participants on average 7 to 10 minutes to complete. I 
administered the survey on October 28, 2019, to 497 respondents from a freshman 
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American Government course at OSU, and they gave informed consent before 
participating (See Appendix 1). I chose to administer the survey in this course because it 
a general education requirement and includes students from a wide range of majors. 
However, my sample tested only college-educated citizens and does not address how 
education could affect people’s discernment of news. 
The survey consisted of 10 images of political advertisements that were posted on 
Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter during the 2016 election (The full survey can be found 
in Appendix 2). All 10 advertisements were created by Russian bots and were posted on 
the House Intelligence Committee’s website as a part of the committee’s assessment. 
Social media users actual saw these ads during the 2016 election, thus increasing my 
study’s external validity. Underneath each advertisement it asked “Is this ad 
trustworthy?” and participants answered, “Yes, it is trustworthy” or “No, it is not 
trustworthy.” The question was framed this way because not all “fake news” boils down 
to facts. Many of the influential political information Russia created was opinion, so 
wording the question in this way forced participants to view the advertisement as a whole 
instead of merely the information it was presenting.  
Dependent Variable  
 
My dependent variable is the participant’s ability to assess whether a news story 
was trustworthy. The dependent variable was the participants “critical reader” score, and 
it was given to them based off of how many advertisements they correctly answered as 
untrustworthy. I coded this variable with a scale from 1 to 10; if they answered that all 10 
ads were untrustworthy, they received a perfect critical reader score of 0. Given the 
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potential variation of this variable, I evaluated my results using a linear regression 
modeling in STATA. 
Independent Variable 
The key independent variable was the strength and direction of partisan self-
identification, as my focus was evaluating whether participants’ level of partisanship 
affected their ability to critically evaluate the advertisement. Using a question from a 
Gallup survey, I asked participants which political party they identified as, and a second 
question asked how strongly they identified with their respective party labels on a scale 
from 0 to 5.  In this scale, 0 meant they do not identify with the respective party and 5 
being they identify very strongly.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of critical reader scores with 0 being a perfect 
score.  Each time a participant answered that an advertisement was trustworthy they 
received a point. Participants with a critical reader score of 10 were the least accurate, 
answering that all 10 of the advertisements were trustworthy. The most frequent score 
among participants was a 6, representing 19.4 percent of the tested population.  
Figure 1: The Variation in Critical Reading  
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Control Variables  
 The survey concluded with questions about the participant’s political participation 
and social media engagement. Participants were asked about their voting history, how 
often they engage in political conversations, how often they watch the news, what types 
of social media they use, and how often they use social media. 
Five of the advertisements were supporting Republican beliefs or Donald Trump 
while the other 5 were supporting Democratic beliefs or either Hillary Clinton or Bernie 
Sanders. Presenting fake news ads that were equally biased towards both political parties 
allowed me to test social media users’ ability to analyze false information as a whole 
instead of solely information that confirms their biases. However, one limitation of 
presenting all fake advertisements is that participants may have felt inclined to mark 
some of the ads as trustworthy because they assumed not all 10 ads could be false.  
Because of experimental limitations, specifically my sampling decision, I was 
unable to control for age or variations in education level. Ninety percent of my 
population fell within the age range of 18 to 25 years old. One classic psychological 
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study revealed that age plays a significant role in a person’s ability to update their beliefs 
(Hess 2000). When a person ages, they are more likely to engage in more biased 
information processing and have less specific and less accurate views on the world.   
However, this does mean that this young student body potentially serves as a hard 
test of the relationship between partisanship and information processes, as college age 
students may actually be more critical of social media information than are older 
generations.  As a result, college age students should be more, not less critical than the 
average population, and less likely to be tricked by my experimental design.   
Results  
 
 To examine the connection between political partisanship and successful 
information processing, I present my linear regression in Table 1. My results show that 
there is a negative correlation between the two, and a strong and significant negative 
coefficient of -.234 confirms my hypothesis. The linear regression shows a statistically 
significant relationship between partisanship and successful information processing 
(p<0.01).  In essence, what this result suggests is that for every one increase in a subject’s 
partisanship (on the 0-5 scale), their tendency to view a Russian bot ad as a “trustworthy 
source” declined by .234 points.   
 




*p<10, **p<.05, ***p<.01  
 
Beyond my main independent variable, the only other variable that might have an 
impact on critical reading is news watching. Participants who watch the news were 
slightly more critical readers, and although the correlation results were outside the 
standard level of significance for political science, this is a relationship worth studying in 
the future. Other forms of political engagement seem to have no effect on improving 
critical reading. 
However, it is important to note the flaws within my experiment. Because the 
population of participants is not representative of the country, I was unable to test how 
demographics such as age, race, or gender affect my dependent variable. These 
characteristics are proven to dramatically affect our views on the world and would likely 
have a strong impact on our ability to discern information. It is also notable that I was 
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unable to test whether the participants were trusting advertisements that fit their pre-
existing political beliefs due to time constraints and personal limitations accompanying 
my data analysis. The data simply shows that stronger partisans on both sides of the 
political spectrum are less critical readers of news.  
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research  
These findings have serious implications for the political environment and 
functioning of our democracy. A healthy democracy is reliant on citizens’ ability to be 
critical consumers of information and their ability to make informed decisions about their 
government and political leaders. Research shows that strong partisans are the most likely 
demographic to vote, so it is imperative they have the tools to be critical news consumers 
(Pew Research Center 2017b).  Because my results found that strong partisans are the 
most likely to believe false political information, the two political parties can be 
influential in preventing this phenomenon by informing their respective bases and 
training its members to be more critical consumers of the news.  
But their efforts alone may not be enough. Without systems in place that can fact 
check or control for quality, social media will continue to be a breeding ground for fake 
news. My suggestions for policy implications include institutionalized changes to the 
flow of information on social media. I support psychologist Dan Kahan’s suggestion to 
develop scientific communication strategies that keep facts relating to policy issues 
protected from influences that generally make them symbols of polarized identity (Kahan 
2012).  
In the future I would like to further explore my data to show and examine how 
specific partisanship to a party or political figure affects this phenomena. I would 
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evaluate which political party a participant was biased toward and break my dependent 
variable into which party or value the specific advertisement favors. This would allow us 
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Appendix 2: Survey to Measure Critical Reading Ability   
 
1. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




2. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




3. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  
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4. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




5. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




6. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  
 b. No, it is not trustworthy 
 
 
   
 
 
7. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




8. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  





9. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




10. Is this ad trustworthy?  
 a. Yes, it is trustworthy  




Social Media Use  
1. Please indicate if you use any of the following social media sites: 
 a. Twitter 
 b. Instagram  
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 c. Facebook 
 d. Snapchat 
 e. Youtube 
 f. Whatsapp 
 g. Pinterest  
 h. Prefer not to answer  
 
2. Thinking about the social media sites you use... How often do you visit these sites? 
 a. Several times a day 
 b. About once a day 
 c. A few times a week 
 d. Every few weeks 
 e. Less often  
 f. Don't know/Prefer not to answer  
 
Ideology/Political Particiaption  
 
1. Which political party do you most closely identify with?  
 a. Republican  
 b. Democrat 
 c. Independent  
 d. Other/Prefer not to answer  
 
2. Did you vote in the 2016 election?  
 a. Yes  
 b. No  
 c. Prefer not to answer  
 
3. How strongly do you identify with this political ideology?  
 a. 0  
 b. 1 
 c. 2 
 d. 3 
 e. 4  
 f. 5 
 
4. How often do you participate in political conversations? 
 a. Every day  
 b. Several times a week 
 c. A couple of times a month  
 d. A couple of times a year 
 e. Never  
5. How often do you read, watch, or listen to the news?  
 a. Several times a day 
 b. Once a day  
 c. Several times a week 
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 d. Once a week/Couple of times a month  
 e. Rarely Ever  




1. What year are you in college?  
 a. Freshman  
 b. Sophomore  
 c. Junior  
 d. Senior  
 e. Other  
 
2. What is your major?  
 a. _________ 
 
3. How old are you?  
 a. Younger than 18 
 b. 18-25 
 c. Older than 25  
 
  
